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Firm growth and productivity in Belarus:
New empirical evidence from the machine
building industry∗
Jesus Crespo Cuaresma† Harald Oberhofer‡ Gallina A. Vincelette§
Abstract
Using a unique dataset comprising information for (up to) 153 firms in the machine build-
ing sector in Belarus, we investigate the determinants of firm growth for an economy
where state ownership of enterprises is widespread. We use panel data models based on
generalizations of Gibrat’s law, total factor productivity estimates and matching meth-
ods to assess the differences in firm growth between private and state-contolled firms.
Our results indicate that labor hoarding and soft budget constraints play a particularly
important role in explaining differences in performance between these two groups of firms.
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1 Introduction
Belarus’s economic growth experience is at odds with standard transition paradigms. Rela-
tively early recovery and uninterrupted growth record since 1996 were not the result of opening
and structural transformation of the economy. In comparison to other countries in Eastern
Europe, which privatized their companies, shed labor and closed unprofitable enterprises, most
Belarusian businesses remained state-owned. Belarus’s impressive growth was not an outcome
of the slow pace of economic reforms, however, but of its dependence on Russia’s energy inputs.
With comparative advantages in its main export markets (CIS, especially Russia), Belarus en-
joyed a 15-year growth run, primarily led by energy-intensive export-oriented state industries.
However, these advantages were transitory. Missed opportunities to pursue a structural trans-
formation of the economy in the boom years narrowed the Belarus’s possibilities to find new
sources of growth and decrease the dependence of its industry on foreign resources. The future
development of the state enterprise sector in Belarus is thus crucial for the overall success of
the Belarusian economy. In this sense, a clear understanding of the functioning of state-owned
firms is pivotal for the implementation of accurate economic policy measures.
In this paper we provide an in-depth analysis of firm growth and its drivers for the machine
building industry in Belarus, which constitutes one of the key industries in the economy. Such
an analysis is unique in several respects. On the one hand, due to the lack of available data,
the Belarusian economy has been notoriously under-researched and this study presents the first
thorough analysis of firm productivity in the country. On the other hand, given the particular
degree of government control exercised in the Belarusian productive sector, our contribution
provides relevant empirical results on the effects of state control in an environment which is
unparalleled in the rest of Europe.
The main aim of the analysis is to address empirically the main forces driving firm profitability
in Belarus. Assessing such a research question implies that we need to move beyond descriptive
statistics to obtain more clear-cut insights on the determinant forces of firm growth in Belarus.
We do so by using the workhorse model of the empirical firm growth literature, which builds
upon Gibrat’s law of proportionate growth. Based on a model of firm size convergence, we
concentrate on assessing the heterogeneity in terms of productivity between state-controlled
and private enterprises.
Our results indicate a significant degree of inefficient resource allocation in state-run firms.
The investigation of the reasons behind the inefficiency in the allocation of production inputs
requires to relate firm characteristics to their performance in terms of total factor productivity
(TFP). We obtain total factor productivity (TFP) estimates applying standard modern econo-
metric techniques and compare the resulting TFP measures across different types of firms.
Simple mean comparison tests unambiguously reveal that state-controlled enterprises produce
less efficiently (and also exhibit lower growth rates of TFP). In a final step, we unveil the sources
of these observed productivity differences. We estimate TFP convergence models and apply
matching estimators in order to assess whether labor hoarding and/or inefficient over-investment
in physical capital are able to explain low levels and growth rates in TFP in state-controlled
companies. Our results indicate that the inefficiencies in state-controlled enterprises are at least
partly related to the use of input factors which makes them less competitive than their private
counterparts.
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the main data issues and present our definition
of state ownership and state control in section two. Section three gives a descriptive view of
1
firm growth dynamics in the Belarusian machine building industry. Section four estimates panel
data models in the framework of Gibrat’s law specifications. The estimates of such models allow
us to assess differences in the firm growth process between state-owned enterprises and private
firms. Section five focuses on the estimation of TFP at the firm level for the machine building
industry. The sources of differences in TFP dynamics between state-controlled and non-state-
controlled firms are studied in section six. Section seven analyses resource misallocation in
more detail using matching techniques. Section eight concludes.
2 The machine building industry in Belarus: Data sources
and definitions
This paper utilizes a new balanced panel dataset for manufacturing firms active in the machine
building industry in Belarus which spans the years 2005 to 2010. Machine building has been
historically one of the specialization sectors of the Belarusian economy and is quantitatively one
of the most relevant industrial sectors in terms of employment and production, accounting for
approximately 22% of total industrial output in 2010 (see World Bank 2012). Prestigious and
well-known firms such as the Minsk Automobile Plant (MAZ) and the Minsk Tractor Works
(MTW) operate in the machine building industry.1
The data are based on a survey that is conducted by Belstat, the national statistical office of
Belarus, and captures all firms operating in at least one of the 18 subsectors of the machine
building industry.2 The available sample of firms only contains firms that report data in each
and every year between 2005 and 2010. It includes the largest machine building firms and,
in particular, a large share of state-controlled enterprises. Due to missing information for
some important firm characteristics, the final dataset contains comprehensive balance sheet
and income statement information for up to 153 firms resulting in a maximum of 914 firm-year
observations.3
The official statistical office classifies a firm as state-owned if the state holds all shares (i.e.,
100%) of the respective firm. Obviously, this definition of state ownership would underesti-
mate the true extent of state ownership in the machine building industry. For this reason,
we apply a different definition for state influence in the machine building industry. According
to World Bank (2012), the Belarusian Ministry of Industry is the main governmental agency
that regulates the business activities of state-owned industrial companies. World Bank (2012)
also discusses some of the main regulatory procedures that are carried out by the Ministry of
Industry including the supervision of the use of energy and other materials or the definition of
input norms for various production technologies in order to ensure an efficient use of resources
in the production process. It is, thus, sensible to assume that the state could directly influ-
ence firms which report to the Ministry of Industry. Our measure of state ownership builds
therefore on information whether a firm reports to the Ministry of Industry. This information
1A detailed description of the historical development of the machine building industry in Belarus is offered
in World Bank (2012) (see Box 3.2).
2These subsectors are the automotive subsector, bearings, chemical and petroleum engineering, construction
and road and municipal engineering, conveying machinery, electrical, industry interdisciplinary productions,
industry metalwork, instrumentation, tools, machinery for light industry, food industry and household appli-
ances, metallurgical engineering, mining and mining engineering, production of sanitary and gas equipment,
radio industry, repair of machinery and equipment and tractor and agricultural machinery.
3See Section 3 for information on the variables and descriptive statistics.
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is gathered from the website of the Belarusian Ministry of Industry, which can be accessed at
http://www.minprom.gov.by/organizacii.4
The largest state-controlled firms in the Belarusian machine building industry operate as de
facto vertically integrated corporate groups. In most cases, a number of subcontracting state-
owned firms produce intermediate goods which are then assembled by the large and prestigious
producers, such as the above mentioned, MAZ or MTW. Vertical integration, on the one hand,
intends to strengthen governance structures within companies and ensures reliable supply of
intermediate inputs (see, e.g., Williamson 1971, Helpman and Krugman 1985). On the other
hand, vertical production chains might help hiding inefficiencies within the production chain.
Thereby, internal transactions of goods and services at non-market prices may allow for cross-
subsidization of inefficient sub-units within the vertical conglomerates. In order to investigate
these issues explicitly using our data, we further distinguish in our analysis among main com-
panies of the vertical chains, the affiliate firms and a third group of independent (not vertically
integrated) firms.
3 Firm growth in Belarus: Descriptive evidence from
the machine building industry
In this section, we briefly present descriptive evidence on the firm growth performance in the
machine building industry and distinguish by the different types of ownership discussed above.
The employment growth rate for the full sample of firms (see Table 1) indicates that the
average firm in the machine building industry reduced its employment by approximately 2.5%
yearly over the period considered. Interestingly, however, a small fraction of outlying firms
exhibited impressive growth rates, with a maximum amount of more than 200% of employment
growth. At a more disaggregated level, when comparing firms that are directly reporting to
the Ministry of Industry with non-ministry-reporting firms, we find that the former group
performed significantly worse. The average ministry-reporting firm exhibits an annual growth
rate of -4.1% while non-reporting firms, on average, keep their level of employment unchanged.
Focusing on different types of firms, such as head companies of vertical chains, affiliates of such
chains and independent firms, the descriptive statistics with regard to employment growth do
not reveal remarkable differences across these groups. However, these types of firms may differ
in other respects that affect their growth pattern. In our econometric analysis we will use this
classification in order to analyse the impact of vertical integration on the growth performance
of firms in the Belarusian machine building industry.
Disaggregating firm growth by sub-industry within the machine building sector reveals that the
(average) firm size in terms of employment is relatively heterogeneous. The average firm size
ranges from approximately 250 employees in the repair of machinery sector to approximately
1,100 employees in automobile production. During the observed time period, the median firm
growth rates across all sub-industries imply that the respective firms reduce their number of
4 We have also applied a different definition of state-ownership which is based on the national accounts
definition. Accordingly, a firm is classified as state-owned if the state directly holds more than 50% of its
shares. Additionally, for this definition a firm is regarded as privately-owned if state-ownership is less than
50%. Finally, we introduce a third type of ownership, referred to as mixed-ownership, for firms with foreign
ownership in addition to state and private owners. For more details on this alternative definition for (direct)
state-ownership and private ownership and for the corresponding estimation results, which broadly confirm our
findings, see Crespo Cuaresma, Oberhofer and Vincelette (2012).
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employees throughout. Here, the only exception is the interdisciplinary production industry,
where the median firm does not change its number of employees from 2005 to 2010. These
downsizing tendencies are most pronounced in the machine-tools sector, with a median firm
growth rate of -6.1%.
Table 2 reports the same information for value added as a measure of firm size and firm growth.5
Table 2 shows that the average value added growth rate is positive and well above 10% in most
cases. However, one should stress that these results might be affected by asymmetric changes
in overall prices (see Footnote 5 for more details). However, qualitatively they are similar to
those obtained for employment. Non-ministry reporting firms again outperform those firms
which report to the Ministry of Industry. This difference in the average value added growth
performance is, however, considerably smaller than for employment. Focusing on different types
of firms, affiliates of vertical production chains tend to exhibit the lowest value added growth
rates on average. Additionally, independent firms also tend to outperform the head companies
of the vertical production chains on average (although the opposite is the case if we consider
the median growth rate of employment, thus indicating that the distribution of firm growth
rates among heads of vertical chains is negatively skewed).
Finally, the disaggregation of value added growth rates by subsector reveals that value added
growth is lowest in more traditional industries such as for production of agricultural machineries
and for production of machine tools. To the contrary, the automobile industry shows impressive
increases in value added, leading to an annual average growth rate of 25%.
4 Modeling firm growth dynamics in the machine build-
ing industry
4.1 Gibrat’s law: Firm size dynamics and convergence trends
In his seminal contribution, Gibrat (1931) argues that firm growth is independent of firm size
and, consequently, firm size follows a random walk. In the empirical firm growth literature this
hypothesis is referred to as Gibrat’s law of proportionate growth. Formally, this implies that
the data generating process for firm growth can be specified as:
lnSit − lnSit−1 = µit, (1)
where Sit denotes the size of firm i at time t (proxied by employment, value added or any other
reasonable measure) and µit is an iid random variable assumed to be normally distributed with
E[µit] = 0 and var[µit] = σ
2 > 0 (see, e.g., Geroski 2005). Accordingly, the growth rate of firm
size between time t− 1 and time t is given by git = lnSit − lnSit−1.
In line with Chesher (1979), we assume that the error term is serially correlated and thus
define µit = ρµit−1 + εit, where εit is assumed to be white noise. Additionally, following God-
dard, McKillop and Wilson (2002), Goddard, Wilson and Blandon (2002) and Giotopoulos and
5The value added figures are based on nominal values and thus might be affected by annual changes in the
overall price level. This might especially be the case if changes in prices for final goods deviate from price
changes for intermediate inputs and raw materials. In our regression analysis, we account for overall price
changes by including year fixed effects in each specification.
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Fotopoulos (2010), among others, we reformulate a typical Gibrat’s law type of equation in
its dynamic representation. We also impose a potentially autocorrelated error term structure,
additionally include (time-varying) control variables (denoted by xit with their respective pa-
rameters γ), account for individual fixed effects (captured by αi) and for (common) time-effects
(denoted by δt). This, in turn, leads to the following formulation of a generalized empirical firm
growth equation,
git = ρgit−1 + (β − 1) lnSit−1 + γxit + αi(1− ρ) + δt + µit, where (2)
µit = εit + ρ(1− β) lnSit−2.
The estimation of (2) allows to jointly test whether firm growth is independent of firm size
(i.e., β = 1) and for autocorrelation in firm growth rates (i.e., ρ 6= 0). Gibrat’s law holds if
β = 1 and ρ = 0 simultaneously (see, e.g., Giotopoulos and Fotopoulos 2010). In this case, µit
reduces to it.
From an econometric point of view, equation (2) is a dynamic panel data model, where typi-
cally a large number of cross-sectional units i (firms) are observed over a relatively short time
period. For this reason our empirical firm growth equation might most appropriately be es-
timated using approaches in the spirit of Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond
(1998). These methods rely on Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate the model
parameters. Indeed, building on previous papers, Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) and Giotopou-
los and Fotopoulos (2010), among others, applied such estimators in order to investigate firm
growth dynamics.
4.2 Empirical specification
To estimate the effect of the main drivers of firm growth in Belarus, we model firm growth from
year t− 1 to year t as a function of firm growth in the previous period, firm size in period t− 1
and a set of controls which we measure at period t− 1.6 The set of controls contains the log of
total wage costs per employee, the log of a firm’s exports, the log of previous years’ investment
and a firm’s capacity utilization. Finally, we use fixed-effect estimators in order to control for
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and year dummies which account for common shocks.7
With regard to the potential drivers of growth, per employee wage costs proxy the firms’
production cost effectiveness. In this sense, firms with lower per employee wage expenses tend
to be more competitive. With regard to a firm’s growth performance, this implies that firms with
lower wages per employees are expected to grow more rapidly. The specification also includes
lagged exports as an explanatory variable to capture the impact of international competition on
a firm’s performance. Additionally, the inclusion of the level of investments allows to test more
directly whether, on average, the surveyed Belarusian machine building firms tend to substitute
factor inputs.
We examine also whether resources are allocated efficiently in the Belarusian machine building
industry. For this reason, we incorporate a firm’s lagged capacity utilization in our firm growth
model. In line with standard neoclassical theories, we thus expect that those firms which
appropriately utilize their inputs will have larger incentives to increase their demand for factor
6This modeling strategy intends to reduce the potential problem of reverse causality.
7Notice that the firm fixed effect also controls for differences across industries as long as the firms do not
change the industry where the produce in.
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inputs. Consequently, we expect a positive impact of capacity utilization on a firm’s employment
growth performance.
We check for the robustness of our results by applying three different estimation strategies: least
squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator, difference GMM estimation based on Arellano and
Bond (1991) and a bias-corrected least squares dummy variable estimator (CLSDV) based
on Kiviet (1995) and Bruno (2005). The latter approach – which applies an approximation
procedure to correct for the Nickell (1981) bias in LSDV estimation of dynamic fixed effects
models – should be most appropriate for our application given the relatively small cross-sectional
dimension of some of the sub-samples studied (see, e.g., Buddelmeyer, Jensen, Oguzoglu and
Webster 2008).
4.3 Estimation results
Table 3 reports our baseline estimation results for employment growth using different sub-
samples for ministry-reporting, and non-ministry-reporting machine building firms. The three
different estimation techniques lead to inconclusive results concerning the impact of lagged
employment growth on the recent growth performance. The LSDV and the GMM estimators
tend to show negative or positive but insignificant correlations in the firm growth rates over
time. In contrast, the results obtained from the CLSDV estimator point to a significantly
positive autocorrelation in firm growth over time, implying that employment growth dynamics
tend to be reinforcing. Interestingly, the positive correlation in employment growth is mainly
driven by ministry-reporting firms.
With regard to the impact of the initial firm size on firm growth, the different estimates com-
monly point to the fact that small firms tend to grow more rapidly than larger ones. The
estimates of (β − 1) are all negative indicating that β < 1. This result is well in line with the
empirical firm growth literature which implies that, over time, firms tend to converge in their
size.8
The qualitative impacts of the rest of the controls on firm growth are comparable across all three
different types of fixed effects estimators. This points to the robustness of the results obtained.
Moreover, utilizing the full sample of machine building firms and applying the preferred CLSDV
estimator we are able to identify significant effects throughout. The parameter estimates of the
lagged value of investments are positive throughout and significant in most of the cases implying
that investments trigger employment growth in Belarusian machine building firms. This effect
seem to be most pronounced for non-ministry reporting firms.
Finally, in line with our expectations, an increase in capacity utilization contributes to employ-
ment growth. Focusing again on the different sub-samples, it becomes obvious that this result
is mainly driven by ministry-reporting firms. An increase in the level of exports, by contrast
tends to reduce employment growth, although this effect is only significant when applying the
LSDV and difference GMM estimators, respectively.
Table 4 provides additional estimation results for main companies of vertical chains its affiliates
as well as for independent firms. Our estimation results again reject Gibrat’s law, implying that
smaller firms exhibit, ceteris paribus, higher employment growth rates. With regard to average
wage costs, firms within the vertical production chains tend to have higher growth rates, while
they are less cost-efficient. Interestingly, when focusing on the results obtained by the CLSDV
8A more detailed analysis of differences in fixed effect estimates may shed more light on this issue.
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estimator provided in both Tables 3 and 4, this effect is insignificant only for the ministry-
reporting firms. Overall, this somehow surprising result might be explained by the unobserved
differences in human capital of the employed labor force. Put differently, if firms employ more
skilled workers, they tend to pay higher wages, but may also become more competitive. This in
turn, might increase the demand for goods produced by the respective firms leading to higher
employment growth rates. More detailed data on the educational attainment of employees,
which are not available, would be necessary in order to assess this hypothesis empirically.
The negative internationalization effect of exports seems to be most important for affiliates
of vertical conglomerates. This result supports the view that those firms which are rather
inexperienced in being involved in international markets are more negatively affected by an
increase in worldwide competition. Interestingly, the positive impact of investment activities
on firm growth does not hold for affiliates of vertical production chains. Consequently, the
employment growth performance of these firms is independent from an increase in capital
inputs. In this regard, affiliates of vertical production chains are similar to ministry-reporting
firms (again, see the corresponding results from Table 3). To the contrary, for all other types
of firms (i.e., head of vertical chain and independent firms) an increase in capital leads to a
subsequent increase in employment growth.
With regard to capacity utilization, we are only able to identify positive effects for independently
organized firms, while in vertical production chains, we tend to find negative effects especially
for the main firms. This result suggests that head companies with lower capacity utilization
tend to experience higher increases in their number of employees. Evidently, this result once
more supports the view that the approach taken for the organization of production in the
Belarusian machine building industries leads to inefficient resource allocation. Thereby, the
role of the relatively large vertical production chains seems to be especially questionable.
5 Total factor productivity in the Belarusian machine
building industry
5.1 Estimating total factor productivity
To investigate productivity differentials between purely state-owned and non-state owned firms,
we specify a functional form for the firm-specific production function. For the sake of simplicity,
we apply a Cobb-Douglas production function, which is given by
Yit = AitL
α
itK
β
it, (3)
where Yit is a measure of output (e.g., value added) of firm i at time t and Lit and Kit denote
labor and capital inputs, respectively. Finally, Ait captures firm-specific TFP, which simulta-
neously affects the marginal products of both inputs. Taking logarithms of the Cobb-Douglas
production function yields
log Yit = α logLit + β logKit + logAit, (4)
which forms the basis of our empirical specification.
Equation (4) implies that the residuals of the estimation of the (log) production function can
be used as a measure of each firm’s TFP. Theoretically, a firm (at least partly) knows its TFP
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and accordingly chooses its level of labor and capital inputs (e.g., more productive firms tend
to produce larger quantities of a good and, consequently, utilize more capital and labor inputs).
Formally, this implies that logAit comprises a systematic component and a true (random) error
term, which modifies the (log) production function to
log Yit = α logLit + β logKit + ωit + it, (5)
where ωit represents a firm’s TFP known only to itself and it is an iid error (see, e.g., Arnold
2005). Since ωit is correlated with the choice of labor and capital inputs, ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation of (5) inter alia suffers from the so-called simultaneity bias (or transmission
bias), leading to inconsistent estimates of α, β and logAit, respectively.
To successfully cope with the simultaneity problem when estimating TFP at the firm level the
econometric literature offers various methodologies.9 In case that the firm-specific systematic
component in the error term is time-invariant (i.e. ωit = ωi), standard fixed-effects estimation
would allow to consistently estimate α and β and thus, TFP would be accurately measured.
However, in case of low within-firm variation the parameters of the production function would
be only weakly identified and in case of ωi varying over t the fixed-effects estimates would also
be inconsistent.
Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) developed alternative (semi-parametric)
estimation procedures, which explicitly deal with the simultaneity bias when estimating pro-
duction functions. The former utilizes a firm’s investment decision to proxy for differences in
ωit, while the latter one proposes the use of intermediate inputs in order to consistently es-
timate the production function. The Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation procedure can only
be applied to firms with non-zero investments and therefore this approach typically excludes a
large number of firms. In contrast, the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach can be applied
to all firms with a non-zero demand of intermediate inputs such as e.g., materials.
5.2 Estimation results for total factor productivity
In order to verify the robustness of our TFP results, we apply four different estimation strategies:
(i) OLS, (ii) fixed-effects, (iii) the approach proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and (iv) the
approached proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Output is measured in terms of value
added, defined as revenues minus costs for material inputs. Table 5 reports the corresponding
estimation results for α and β.
With regard to the labor and capital elasticities the four different estimation strategies lead to
conflicting results. For example, the input elasticities obtained from the simple OLS estimation
indicate that the Belarusian machine building industry produces using a rather labor intensive
technology, while the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure suggests the opposite.
Regarding the measurement of TFP, the residuals of the various production function estimates
are of major interest. In contrast with the estimates of input elasticities, the TFP measures
obtained form the four different procedures are very similar, with the correlation exceeding 0.95
in almost all cases. The only exception is the fixed effects estimator, which leads to a relatively
poorly correlated TFP measure. However, in our application this latter estimator suffers from
low within-firm variation leading to weakly identified input elasticities. For this reason, we
9For a recent survey on the estimation of TFP at the macroeconomic and the microeconomic level, see Del
Gatto, Di Liberto and Petraglia (2011).
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Table 5: Estimation results: Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function in machine building industries
Model
OLS FE OPa LPb
Labor 0.583∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.064) (0.097) (0.088)
Capital 0.391∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.065) (0.144) (0.171)
Returns to scale 0.974 0.421 0.834 0.883
Wald testc 2.10 53.09∗∗∗ 1.19 1.21
Observations 914 914 759 914
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.*(*)[***] stands
for significance at the 10%(5%)[1%] level. All regressions
inlclude year fixed effects.
aOP indicates the Olley and Pakes (1996) approach.
bLP indicates the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach,
where material costs proxy for unobserved productivity
shocks. c The Wald test assumes constant returns to
scale (i.e., α+ β = 1) as the null hypothesis.
use the TFP measures based on all four different estimation results in order to compare TFP
between ministry-reporting and non-ministry-reporting Belarusian machine-building firms.
Our results indicate that TFP in non-ministry-reporting Belarusian machine-building firms ex-
ceeds the corresponding level of productivity in ministry-reporting enterprises (see Table 6).10
Excluding the unreliable fixed effects estimation results from our discussion, the upper part in
Table 6 indicates that, on average, non-ministry-reporting firms exhibit higher levels of TFP. In-
deed, according to the results obtained from the other three estimation procedures (OLS, Olley
and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)), the TFP levels of non-ministry-reporting
firms substantially exceed the corresponding figures of their ministry-reporting counterparts.
Some TFP estimators even indicate that the productivity levels for non-state-influenced firms
are approximately doubled. The results presented in the bottom of Table 6 indicate that there
are no significant differences with regard to TFP growth across the two types of firm. Taking
into account all empirical results presented, the simple mean comparison tests unambiguously
document that state-owned and state-influenced firms exhibit lower levels of TFP.11
10The Table provides the results of simple t-tests with unequal variances in the sub-populations for ministry-
reporting and non-ministry reporting firms.
11Moreover, the results in Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2012) document that this TFP gap has widened during
the period from 2005 to 2010 when focusing on alternative measures of state ownership.
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Table 6: T-Test for Differences in TFP
between ministry-reporting and non-
ministry-reporting firms
Ministry- Non-Ministry- Diff.
reportinga reportinga
Levels in TFP
OLS 0.988 1.494 −0.506∗∗∗
FE 2.065 1.389 0.676∗∗∗
OP 16.937 21.641 −4.704∗∗∗
LP 4.513 6.189 −1.676∗∗∗
Growth in TFP
OLS 0.124 0.104 0.020
FE 0.119 0.104 0.015
OP 0.193 0.164 0.029
LP 0.150 0.122 0.028
Notes: *** stands for significance at the 1%
level.
aThe group of firms directly reporting to the
Ministry of Industry and the group of non-
reporting firms comprise 439 and 442 firm-
year observations, respectively.
6 Unveiling the source of productivity differences
The results in the previous section indicate that large productivity differences exist between
state-owned enterprises and private firms in the Belarusian machine building industry. In this
section, we investigate this issue further using models that aim at identifying the determinants
of TFP differences across firms. We start by estimating convergence equations for TFP to
assess whether the dynamics of productivity lead to corrections in the observed differences in
TFP. In particular, we estimate a model given by
∆ logAit = ρ0 + ρ1SOEit + λ logAit−1 + εit, (6)
where a negative estimate of λ indicates convergence. The presence of convergence dynamics
would point to the fact that, on average, firms with low productivity levels tend to increase their
productivity more than their high-productivity counterparts. We include a dummy variable for
state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the specification, whose parameter estimate informs us about
whether state-controlled firms converge in the long-run to higher, lower or similar productivity
levels as compared to non-ministry-reporting firms.12
Since we are interested in unveiling convergence dynamics between firms, we do not include
firm-specific fixed effects in the specification at this point.13 The results of the estimation of
equation (6) are presented in Table 7 for the different TFP data obtained using the methods
described above.
12The long-run equilibrium for private firms according to equation (6) is given by ρ0/− λ, while state-owned
enterprises converge to (ρ0 + ρ1)/− λ.
13All specifications include year fixed effects.
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Table 7: Convergence equations: TFP
OLS FE OP LP
Lagged TFP −0.145∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006)
State-owned −0.082∗∗ −0.012 −0.046∗∗ −0.060∗
(0.036) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033)
Intercept 0.256∗∗∗ 0.071∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.037) (0.055) (0.055)
R2 0.067 0.012 0.094 0.085
Obs. 724 724 724 724
Notes: Each column refers to a different TFP estimate,
abbreviations as in preceding section. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. *(*)[***] stands for significance at
the 10%(5%)[1%] level.
The qualitative conclusions from the estimation results appear independent from the TFP data
used. In all cases, the results indicate convergence dynamics in total factor productivity, as
can be inferred from the negative and significant parameter estimates attached to the lagged
TFP level. However, the long-run equilibrium towards which productivity levels converge is
significantly lower for state-controlled enterprises as compared to non-ministry-reporting firms.
This result is reflected in the negative (and in two cases significant) coefficient estimates attached
to the dummy variable which identifies state-owned firms.
Once differences in TFP dynamics have been found, the question remains concerning where
such differences come from. Labor hoarding, overinvestment or unproductive investments are
potential explanations for such a result. In our next modeling step, we expand equation (6)
adding new explanatory variables with the aim of explaining the source of productivity differ-
ences across firm groups. The general specification which we estimate is given by
∆ logAit = ρ0 + ρ1SOEit + λ logAit−1 + λ1SOEit logAit−1 + γ1∆ logLt + γ2∆ logKt + εit. (7)
In such a model, we allow for a different speed of convergence for state-controlled and non-
ministry-reporting firms, which is captured by the interaction between the SOE dummy and
logAit−1, and include employment growth and the growth rate of capital as additional determi-
nants of TFP growth. The explanatory power of employment growth and/or physical capital
growth for TFP dynamics should indicate which input dynamics can explain different pro-
ductivity developments across enterprises in the machine-building industry. If state-controlled
firms performed poorly in terms of productivity growth because of labor hoarding, differences
in employment growth should be able to account at least partly for TFP growth differences.
Conversely, if unproductive investments were responsible for these differences, the growth in
capital stock should be a significant determinant of TFP growth gaps between firms.
Table 8 presents the results of the estimation of (7) using standard OLS methods (where
between-firm differences are the dominating source of variation) and fixed effects estimation
(which aims at explaining within-firm changes in productivity). Starting with the OLS re-
sults, the most remarkable result in Table 8 is that, once that model (6) is expanded to the
specification given by (7), the SOE dummy loses its significance for all TFP estimates.
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This result, together with the estimates of the covariates included in the specification, implies
that the differences in TFP growth between state-controlled and non-state-controlled firms can
be explained by (a) their different dynamics in terms of adjustment to the equilibrium (mirrored
in the significant parameters for the interaction of SOE and logAit−1 for fixed-effects based TFP
measures) and (b) differences in the accumulation of production factors. The second explanation
seems to be more strongly supported by the data. Three of the specifications indicate that
the lower TFP growth emanates from the fact that firms have increased employment in a
framework where production was either decreasing or increasing at a lower rate than labor
input. All 8 different specifications, applying either between or within firm variation, commonly
indicate that the source of productivity growth differences is based on unproductive investment
in physical capital. Put informally, inefficient capital allocation within ministry-reporting firms
seems to be a robust driving force of the low level of productivity growth observed in these
firms. Overall, the conclusion that can be inferred from the OLS and FE results in Table 8
is that growth of input factors, in general, might explain partially lower TFP growth rates in
state-controlled enterprises.
Taking into account the developments in aggregate production during the period considered,
which have been marked by the effects of the global recession, our results indicate that the
likely reason for the polarization in firm productivity between state-owned enterprises and non-
state-controlled firms is related to a potential missallocation of resources at the firm level. The
loss of productivity in state-controlled enterprises can, at least partly, be explained by sub-
optimal decisions when it comes to labor allocation and capital investments during the period
2005-2010.
7 Soft budget constraints and inefficient resource allo-
cation
The results from the previous section indicate the existence of inefficiencies in state-owned firms
due to labor hoarding and/or unproductive investments. This section provides results using an
alternative method to investigate this issue further. We focus explicitly on potentially prevailing
soft budget constraints (SBCs) in the sample of firms. SBCs in state-owned enterprises might
arise if the government favours these companies vis-a`-vis private competitors. Such SBCs may
take the form of access to below cost energy inputs, preferential tax treatment, preferential
access to financing, subsidy of interest rate payments or preferential access to procurement
tenders.14
In order to empirically analyze whether SBCs are observable in the Belarusian machine building
industry, we apply a simple matching approach. State ownership cannot be credibly considered
to be comparable with a treatment which is applied randomly across firms. Some (eventu-
ally unobservable) firm characteristics tend to affect both the probability of being state-owned
and their economic performance, so sample selection is a potential statistical problem in our
empirical application. For our study, we draw on existing theoretical contributions related to
matching estimators for average treatment effects by Abadie and Imbens (2006) and imple-
ment the corresponding estimators as discussed in Abadie, Drukker, Herr and Imbens (2004).15
14Kornai et al. (2003) provide an excellent survey on SBCs. See also World Bank (2012).
15Literature reviews on matching estimators are provided by Cobb-Clark and Crossley (2003), Imbens (2004),
Blundell and Costa Dias (2009) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).
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Matching estimators are well established in the so-called program evaluation literature, which
intends to identify the economic impact of certain policy measures. In our case, the policy vari-
able (treatment) of interest is state-ownership which is again measured with the information
on firms reporting to the Ministry of Industry, and our aim is to assess whether labor hoarding
and/or unproductive investments are present in these firms.
The two most commonly used estimators for treatment effects of policy intervention are the
average treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The
former estimates the average effect of the policy program for a randomly drawn firm from
the whole sample while the latter only considers the sub-sample of ministry-reporting firms.
Formally, these two estimators are given by (see, e.g., Wooldridge 2010)
τATE = E(y1 − y0), and (8)
τATT = E(y1 − y0|w = 1), (9)
where w = 1 if a firm reports to the Ministry of Industry and 0 otherwise. y1 and y0 denote the
outcome under treatment and non-treatment, respectively. The problem in this setting is that
for each firm only one outcome is observable. If a firm is state-owned, we only observe y1; while
for non-ministry-reporting firms only y0 is available. The matching approach (among other
methods) intends to identify the counterfactual unobservable outcome for each firm. Here, the
basic idea is that the most similar firms with regard to the outcome-relevant characteristics in
the control group constitute the best estimate for the unobservable counterfactual outcome. If
for example two firms, one state-owned and the other non-ministry-reporting, are equal in all
determinants of the final outcome an observable difference between these two can be traced
back to the influence of the Ministry of Industry.
In our empirical application, we are interested in phenomena such as labor hoarding and in-
efficient investment in physical capital. We evaluate the existence of SBCs taking explicitly
the vertical organizational structure of firms into account. We start with an analysis focused
on subsidiary firms of these vertical chains as well as on independent firms.16 We restrict our
matching procedure to only consider firms which are of the same type as the respective firms,
and thus, we compare our outcomes of interest only for subsidiary firms or independent firms.
Table 9 provides the results. The upper part of Table 9 presents the results when we average
our log-differences for the ATE and ATT over both types of firms while the second and third
parts individually focus on the sub-samples of subsidiary and independent firms, respectively.
For all three different matching estimators the counterfactual outcome for each firm is based
on the three nearest neighboring firms based on the matching variables.
Our various matching estimators commonly restrict the comparison to the same type of firms in
the same year. This guarantees that we only compare subsidiaries of vertical production chains
and independent firms with each other, respectively. Moreover, due to the cyclical behavior of
the whole economy during our observation period, we only compare labor and capital inputs
within the same years. Additionally, for our analysis of employment and physical capital, we
match firms based on their level of TFP, TFP growth, profits, value added, revenues and the
firm’s industrial sub-sector as well as its regional location. Here, TFP is calculated as the
average of our four different measures.
16Unfortunately, all head firms of the large networks report to the Ministry of Industry and, thus, our dataset
lacks a proper control group for this subset of firms.
18
Table 9: Matching Estimates for SBCs
Employmenta Physical capitala
Subsidiaries and Independent Firms
(3 nearest neighbours)
ATE 0.443∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.128)
ATT 0.467∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.108)
Subsidiaries Firms
(3 nearest neighbours)
ATE 0.680∗∗ 0.196
(0.281) (0.205)
ATT 0.732∗∗∗ 0.256
(0.282) (0.206)
Independent Firms
(3 nearest neighbours)
ATE 0.832∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.152)
ATT 0.989∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.125)
Notes: Robust standard errors in paren-
thesis. **(***) stands for significance at
the 5%(1%) level.
a Matching is based on level of TFP, TFP
growth, profits, exports, value added,
sub-industry and time fixed effects.
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With regard to these two input variables, our results are well in line with what we have ob-
tained so far. In particular, as indicated by both the ATEs and the ATTs, state-controlled
firms with most similar characteristics employ more workers as compared to non-reporting en-
terprises. For example, the average subsidiary or independent state-controlled firm employs
46.7% more workers than it would employ as non-controlled company. Similarly, the ATT in-
cluding both types of firms indicates that for the same level and growth rate of TFP and all
other matching variables, the capital input of state-owned enterprises is roughly twice as high
as in non-ministry-reporting firms. This reinforces our argument that not only labor hoarding
but also overinvestment is important in the Belarusian machine building industry.
8 Concluding remarks
This paper evaluates the economic performance of state-controlled versus non-state-owned firms
in the Belarusian machine-building industry. Empirically, the focus is on the firm growth perfor-
mance and on total factor productivity. We apply standard modern methods from the empirical
firm growth literature and our results indicate that firm growth (in terms of employment) in
state-controlled firms might be unsustainable and driven by inefficient resource allocation. Our
results also indicate that vertical production chains might be particularly important for explain-
ing the source of the misallocation of resources. We use matching techniques to investigate the
instruments used to enable such resource misallocation. Soft budget constraints appear to be
in place in the sector. The group of state-controlled subsidiaries of vertical networks tends to
benefit most from such soft budget constraints.
From an economic point of view, these firm growth trends can have very relevant effects on
firm productivity dynamics. Using estimates of total factor productivity (TFP), which account
for the simultanity bias, we unambiguously reveal that state-owned firms are less efficient than
their non-ministry-reporting counterparts. Moreover, TFP convergence equations show that
the dynamics and long-run level of productivity is substantially lower for this group of firms.
Labor hoarding and unproductive overinvestment are possible explanatory factors for these
differences. With the aid of extended TFP convergence equations, we are able to demonstrate
that for the Belarusian machine building industry the unsustainable increases in input factors
might be responsible for the low level of productivity in state-controlled firms. These results
are further confirmed using matching methods, where potential sample selection issues are
accounted for.
In the long-run, the inefficiencies which have been identified are likely to lead to adverse eco-
nomic consequences. In a globalized world economy, inefficient firms will not be competitive
and, thus, Belarusian machine building firms will find it hard to successfully participate in
international markets. Relying exclusively on local demand would not allow for these firms to
produce at the minimum efficient scale.
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